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Abstract
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Female family headship has strong implications for endemic poverty in the United States.
Consequently, it is imperative to explore the chief factors that contribute to this problem.
Departing from prior literature that places significant weight on welfare-incentive effects, our
study highlights the role of male marriageability in explaining the prevalence of never-married
female family headship for blacks and whites. Specifically, we examine racial differences in the
effect of male marriageability on never-married female headship from 1980 to 2010. By exploiting
data from IPUMS-USA (N = 4,958,722) and exogenous variation from state-level sentencing
reforms, the study finds that the decline in the relative supply of marriageable males significantly
increases the incidence of never-married female family headship for blacks but not for whites.

JEL Classifications
J11; J12; J15

1. INTRODUCTION
Author Manuscript

Female family headship in the United States has risen sharply over the past few decades. In
1970, only 11.5 percent of U.S. families were headed by females. Now, more than 25
percent of U.S. families are characterized as such. It is critical to examine this upward trend
in female family headship because of the implications for poverty.
By 2014, almost 47 million Americans lived in poverty, corresponding to an overall poverty
rate of nearly 15 percent (U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1960 to 2015
Annual Social and Economic Supplements). What is especially noteworthy is that poverty
tends to be a distinctive characteristic of female-headed households. As early as 1959, the
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poverty rate for female-headed families with children was 60 percent, four times higher than
the poverty rate for all families (Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic
Supplements, Historical Poverty Tables). By 2011, the poverty rate for female-headed
families was 40.9%, which is almost 30 percentage points higher than the poverty rate for all
families (Gould 2012; U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2014 and 2015
Annual Social and Economic Supplements).
In addition to the poverty crisis, the racial divide is another significant aspect of female
headship. In 2011, female-headed households comprised 55 percent of all black families,
while only 22 percent of white families were female-headed. Consequently, our study aims
to improve our understanding of the persistence of female family headship problem as well
as why such stark racial differences exist.

Author Manuscript

To date, much of the female family headship literature has focused on the role of welfare
benefits. Scholars argue that the implementation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) reduced women’s economic incentives to marry, while increasing their incentives to
bear children outside of wedlock (Garfinkel et al. 2003; Lichter et al. 1991; Lloyd and South
1996; Moynihan 1967; Teitler et al. 2009; Willis 2009).

Author Manuscript

The AFDC was later reformed under the 1988 Family Support Act and under the 1996
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). With lower
benefits under each reform, the question of whether welfare encourages female headship is
still unsettled. Several studies find evidence of the welfare-incentive effect (e.g., Hoffman
and Foster 2000; Lichter, McLaughlin, and Ribar 1997; Moffitt 1992, 1994; Murray 1993;
Rosenzweig 1999), while others conclude that the effect is non-existent or negligible at best
(Blau, Kahn, and Waldfogel 2002; Darity and Myers 1984; 1995; Hoynes 1997; Moffit
1994, 1998).
To shed new light on the preponderance of female headship, our study investigates the role
of scarcity of marriageable males. Male scarcity has long been identified as a key
determinant of family formation (e.g., Cox 1940; Cready, Fossett and Kiecolt 1997;
Guttentag and Secord 1983; Harknett 2008; Harknett and McLahanan 2004; Jackson 1972;
Kiecolt and Fossett 1995; Neal 2004; South and Lloyd 1992; Willis 1999). However, male
marriageability (or the economic attractiveness of males as potential marriage partners) is
also relevant to understanding the family formation process (e.g. Darity and Myers 1995;
Lichter et al 1992; Raley 1996; Wilson and Neckerman 1986; Wood 1995). But in contrast
to this literature, our study attempts to make causal inferences about this relationship.

Author Manuscript

More specifically, our study examines the role of male marriageability in explaining female
family headship. It focuses on never-married female headship because this family structure
is steadily increasing among both blacks and whites. The study also explores the racial
divide that persists among female-headed families by illustrating that the effect of male
marriageability is distinctly different for blacks and whites. Using state-level variation in
sentencing reforms to instrument for male marriageability, the empirical findings indicate
that the decline in the relative supply of marriageable males raises the incidence of nevermarried female headship significantly for blacks but not for whites.
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Hereafter, the paper is organized as follows: a Background section discussing the prevalence
and determinants of never-married female family headship; the Data and Methods; the
Results; and the Conclusion.

2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Prevalence of Female Family Headship

Author Manuscript

Today, female headship remains high at over 25 percent of all families. Since female-headed
families (and never-married female-headed families in particular) are prone to poverty
(McLanahan and Booth 1989; Fitzgerald and Ribar 2004; Lerman 1996), children raised in
these households are susceptible to socio-economic disadvantages that eventually lead to
unfavorable adult outcomes. It is also important to note that the prevalence of female
headship differs significantly between blacks and whites, maintaining a large racial divide in
patterns of family structure.
Figure 1 displays racial differences in the fraction of female-headed households from 1970
to 2011. The percentage of black female-headed households ranged from 33 percent to 60
percent, while the percentage of white female-headed households ranged from about 9
percent to 22 percent during this same period. However, the steepest increase in female
headship for blacks and whites occurred after 1970 and continued into the 1980s.
Subsequent to 1990, female headship increased by a much smaller magnitude; yet, a vast
and relatively stable racial disparity persists among female-headed households.
2.2. Welfare and Female Economic Status

Author Manuscript

Becker’s theory of marriage (Becker 1973, 1974, 1981) posits that a woman will only marry
if the economic benefits gained from marriage exceed those gained outside of marriage. This
theory boosted the argument that welfare benefits were chiefly responsible for the rise in
female family headship. With poor economic prospects traditionally facing black men, the
U.S. welfare system was criticized as promoting non-marital childbearing and female
headship within the black community (Garfinkel et al. 2003; Lichter et al. 1991; Lloyd and
South 1996; Moynihan 1967; Teitler et al. 2009; Willis 2009).
Under AFDC in particular, scholars argue that the economic incentives of non-marital
fertility and female headship are positively linked to this welfare regime (e.g. Hoffman and
Foster 2000; Lichter, McLaughlin, and Ribar 1997; Moffitt 1992, 1994; Murray 1993;
Rosenzweig 1999). This is because the AFDC made it much more difficult to obtain benefits
when married or living in extended family arrangements (Blau, Kahn and Waldfogel 2002;
Lichter, McLaughlin, and Ribar 1997).

Author Manuscript

Still, others discredit the welfare-incentive theory (particularly any claims of race-specific
effects), citing the rising trend of female-headship among households at all economic strata
in the United States (Lichter, McLaughlin, and Ribar 1997), the role of structural and socioeconomic disadvantages (Murray 1993; Darity 2011; Darity and Myers 1984, 1995; Darity,
Myers, and Chung 1998), and the decline in real welfare benefits over time (Darity and
Myers 1984, 1995). It is also important to acknowledge that the evidence for the welfareincentive effect on female family headship may have been conflated by technical statistical
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issues, including omitted variable bias and reverse causality. Studies that addressed these
issues either found weak support for the welfare-incentive effect (Moffit 1994, 1998; Blau,
Kahn, and Waldfogel, 2002) or no welfare-incentive effect (Darity and Myers 1984, 1995;
Hoynes 1997).
The passage of PRWORA in 1996 and the new regime, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), stipulated new reforms (such as time limits and work provisions), aimed at
improving the employment situation of participants, while providing bonuses to states that
lowered non-marital fertility without raising abortion rates (Blank 2002; Burstein 2007).
Despite these changes, there still is little evidence to support the hypothesis that welfare
benefits incentivize female headship (Fitzgerald and Ribar 2004).

Author Manuscript

Female economic status may also play a crucial role in understanding the rise in female
headship. Becker (1981) argues that the relative improvement in female economic status
may erode traditional gender roles of the family, as well as the need for marriage. Based on
this hypothesis, female economic status is expected to increase the incidence of female
headship.
On the other hand, female economic status may work to reduce female headship. Previous
studies find that female economic status raises women’s attractiveness as potential spouses
(Sweeney and Cancian 2004; Willis 1999) because males are likely to engage in relationship
hypergamy or the “marry-up” phenomenon (Lichter et al. 1992; Mare and Winship 1991).
2.3. Marriage Market Conditions

Author Manuscript

Beyond welfare and female economic status, prior works illustrate that the mere scarcity of
males lowers marriage rates and depresses the timing of marriage, even as it raises nonmarital childbearing (Angrist 2002; Brien 1997; Cox 1940; Cready, Fossett and Kiecolt
1997; Darity and Myers 1983, 1984, 1995; Guttentag and Secord 1983; Lichter et al. 1991,
1992; Harknett 2008; Harknett and McLahanan 2004; Jackson 1972; Kiecolt and Fossett
1995; Neal 2004; South 1996; South and Lloyd 1992; Willis 1999). This evidence is
underscored by the theory that male scarcity diminishes marriage opportunities for women.
Consequently, relative male bargaining power within the marriage market rises (Guttentag
and Secord 1983; Oppenheimer 1988; Becker 1981), such that men can achieve marital
benefits even outside of marriage (Cready, Fossett and Kiecolt 1997).

Author Manuscript

The “quality” of males may be even more important than the quantity of males in
understanding the prevalence and racial divide in female headship. The attractiveness of
males as marriage prospects is highly correlated with the ability to be strong economic
providers or breadwinners in the household (e.g., Koball 1998; Lichter et al. 1991; Testa and
Krogh 1995; Schneider 2011; South 1996; Watson and McLanahan 2010; Wilson 1987). For
black males, however, high levels of unemployment stifle their economic potential and
subsequently their attractiveness as prospective husbands (Darity and Myers 1995; Darity,
Myers, and Chung 1998; Fossett and Kiecolt 1993; Koball 1998; Lichter et al. 1991;
Schneider 2011; Watson and McLanahan 2010; Western and Wildeman 2009). In 1990, the
black male unemployment rate was 10.3 percent while the unemployment rate for all males
was 4.7 percent. By 2011, the black male unemployment rate had risen to 16.8 percent and
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remained more than 5 percentage points higher than the average male unemployment rate
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Mass incarceration also limits the economic attractiveness of males as viable marriage
partners (Darity and Myers 1995; Western and Wildeman 2009; Charles and Luoh 2010).
While some have argued that there are positive externalities produced from male
incarceration (Charles and Luoh 2010; Mechoulan 2010; South 1996; South and Lloyd
1992), the costs to economic outcomes (including the erosion of human capital, collateral
consequences, and criminal recidivism) are likely to outweigh these putative benefits.

Author Manuscript

Since the 1970s, the number of individuals incarcerated in the United States has risen by
more than 500 percent, exceeding two million persons by 2011 (Raphael and Stoll 2013).
Moreover, male incarceration rates are disproportionately higher for blacks (Pettit and
Western 2004; Western 2006; Western and Wildeman 2009), suggesting that black women
are more critically disadvantaged in terms of their marital prospects (Charles and Luoh
2010; Cready, Fossett and Kiecolt 1997; Darity and Myers 1995; Darity, Myers and Chung
1998; Koball, 1998; Western and Wildeman 2009; Western 2006).

Author Manuscript

Wilson and Neckerman (1986) were the first to explore the relationship between male
marriageability and marriage, finding a strong inverse relationship between employed males
and marriage rates. Other studies confirm the adverse effect of the relative supply of
employed males on marriage rates (Lichter et al. 1992; Raley 1996; Wood 1995). However,
the effects detected in these later studies are marginal by comparison. By contrast, Darity
and Myers (1995) concurred with Wilson and Neckerman (1986). This study illustrates that
the overall incidence of female headship from 1976 to 1985 increased in response to the
decline in male marriageability. The study also showed that the male marriageability
problem was even more severe than previously thought.
Although these studies explore the relationship between male marriageability and family
formation, none have been able to produce causal inferences concerning this relationship
(Darity and Myers 1995; Lichter et al. 1992; Raley 1996; Wilson and Neckerman 1986;
Wood 1995). Our study adds to the literature by using novel instrumental variables (IV) and
instrumental variables-probit (IVProbit) strategies to identify the race-specific effects of
male marriageability on female headship from 1980 to 2010.

3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODS
3.1. Data

Author Manuscript

The data for this study are obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series – USA
(IPUMS-USA) from 1980 to 2010 (Ruggles et al. 2010). The IPUMS-USA provides data for
the total U.S. population, and not just the non-institutionalized population characteristic of
other national datasets. The analysis sample is restricted to black and white females who are
18 years or older, since they are unlikely to assume head of household responsibilities prior
to that time.
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To measure the relative supply of marriageable males, we use the ratio of unmarried males
in the labor force or in school to unmarried females (Darity and Myers 1995). Darity and
Myers (1995) also provided a detailed analysis of various sex-ratio measures and found this
to be the most comprehensive measure of the relative supply of marriageable males1. Male
marriageability studies that only utilize the number of employed males (Lichter et al. 1992;
Raley 1996; Wilson and Neckerman 1986; Wood 1995) exclude a sizeable male population
that is currently in school, and is also economically attractive.2

Author Manuscript

The study also focuses on racially homogenous marriage markets because black-white interracial marriage rates are relatively low in general, especially for black women (Taylor et al.
2010). Additionally, we focus on the heterosexual marriage market given that our period of
analysis ranges from 1980 to 2010 and state approval of homosexual marriages did not begin
until the turn of this century. While cohabiting relationships are a nontrivial and growing
type of family structure in the United States, the data do not allow for identification of these
families.
The level of geographic aggregation that defines a marriage market has been frequently
scrutinized in the marriage market literature. This is because it hinges upon a critical
assumption about the size and scope of the geographical area that the individual uses to
search for a potential mate. Brien (1997) argued that defining a marriage market area that is
too large (such as at the state-level), may confound significantly within-area variations in
local marriage markets. On the other hand, if the marriage market area is defined too
narrowly (such as at the city or county level), data may not be available for all racial-ethnic
groups (especially blacks), leading to major challenges in constructing consistent marriage
markets.

Author Manuscript

Therefore, using a marriage market somewhere between the two extremes would be
preferred. Our study defines the marriage market as the labor market area/commuting zone
(LMACZ) in which the individual resides. LMACZs are geographical boundaries, with at
least 100,000 individuals, that closely represent the local economy where individuals both
work and reside3. This is arguably a stronger representation of local marriage markets
relative to counties (which may be too small) and states (which may be too large). LMACZs
are also more extensive than metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that only identify highly
populated areas.
3.2. Empirical Methods
To examine the relationship between male marriageability and never-married female family
headship, the following binary choice model is specified:

Author Manuscript

1Darity and Myers (1995) analyzed four different sex-ratio measures: (i) the ratio of males to females, (ii) the ratio of unmarried males
to unmarried females, (iii) the ratio of employed males to females, and (iv) the ratio of unmarried males employed or in school to
unmarried females.
2Simple calculations from IPUMS-USA data indicate that approximately 10% of men over the age of eighteen are unemployed but
currently in school.
3There are more than 3100 LMACZs across the United States.
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P FH i, l, t = 1 | . = β0 + β1 MM r, a, l, t + X i, t β2 + W i, s, t β3 + β4 Incr, s, t + λ1 + ςs + t + εi, l, t

(1)

Author Manuscript

where i represents individuals in the sample, r denotes race (black or white), a denotes age, l
denotes LMACZs, and t represents the survey-years (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010). FH is a
binary indicator equal to 1 for never-married mothers who are heads of household and 0
otherwise. MM denotes the race-, age-, LMACZ-, and year-specific ratio of unmarried males
employed or in school to unmarried females. To capture individual-level characteristics (X),
the specification accounts for individual-specific age, education, and number of children. To
evaluate welfare and female economic status (W), the model controls for state- and yearspecific real maximum welfare benefits for a family of three (expressed in 2010$)4 as well
as race-, state-, and year-specific median female earnings (expressed in 2010$). Inc denotes
the race-, state-, and year-specific male incarceration rate (per 100,000 persons). The model
also includes LMACZ-specific (λl), state-specific (ςs), and general (t) time trends.
We utilize linear probability and probit regression framework to estimate Equation (1)
separately for blacks and whites. This is consistent with our aim of assessing how racially
homogenous marriage market conditions influence race-specific never-married female
headship from 1980 to 2010.

Author Manuscript

One limitation of the OLS and probit models however, is that the relative supply of
marriageable males may be correlated with unobserved characteristics (e.g., marital
preferences and family values) also linked to never- married female headship. If these
characteristics work to reduce the ratio of unmarried males (employed or in school) to
unmarried females while increasing the odds of female headship, OLS and probit estimates
are likely to be biased away from zero. However, the aggregate measure of the relative
supply of marriageable males also may be susceptible to measurement error, thereby
attenuating estimates toward zero. To address these issues, the study implements
instrumental variables (IV) and Newey’s two-step instrumental variables-probit5 (IVProbit)
models using state-level variation from six main sentencing reforms that began in the late
1970s.

Author Manuscript

These sentencing reforms are: sentencing guidelines (presumptive and voluntary), statutory
presumptive sentencing, determinate sentencing, truth in sentencing, and three strike laws
(Harmon 2015). Presumptive sentencing guidelines are defined by a range of sentences
based on the severity of an offense and prior criminal records. Voluntary sentencing
guidelines on the other hand, are viewed as formal recommendations rather than legal
mandates for judicial disposition. Statutory presumptive guidelines serve as a sentencing

4Welfare benefits represented the only measure not constructed using IPUMS-USA data; these data were retrieved from the Office of
Family Assistance, Administration of Children and Families (1990–2010) and U.S. Social Security Administration.
5The IVPROBIT model is similar to the IV model in the first stage but uses probit estimation in the second stage to determine the
relationship between the relative supply of marriageable males and never-married female family headship.
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rubric by indicating the typical sentence for a particular offense. Determinate sentencing
operates without discretionary parole boards whereas truth in sentencing (according to the
1994 Omnibus Crime Bill) mandates that at least 85% of an original sentence must be
served by an offender. Finally, three strikes laws recommend more stringent sentencing after
the third felony offense.
Appendix Table A1 presents the years in which these sentencing reforms were implemented
in each state (adapted from Harmon 2015). The table indicates that there are forty states that
adopted sentencing reforms; twenty-nine of these adopted at least two. Reforms in
sentencing began as a response to the “law and order” movement of the 1960s and continued
into the 1990s as a part of the widespread “tough on crime” philosophy. Over these three
decades, the United States waged a dual war on crime and drugs that called for more
stringent sanctions to fuel criminal deterrence (Harmon 2015).

Author Manuscript

With the imprisonment boom that began in the 1980s however, some argue that the onset of
sentencing reform not only worked to spur mass incarceration in the United States (e.g.,
Marvell, 1995; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2006; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson 2006) but
also racial inequities in sentencing (e.g., Harmon 2011; Tonry 1995; Marvell 1995;
Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2006; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson, 2006).

Author Manuscript

Using incarceration data from the National Prisoner Statistics and state-variation in
sentencing reforms, the study illustrates how black and white male incarceration rates
change after the implementation of sentencing reforms. Figure 2 shows that black and white
male incarceration rates changed markedly after each sentencing reform was implemented,
albeit more dramatically for black males. For instance, male incarceration rates in states that
implemented presumptive sentencing increased by about 70 percent for blacks but declined
by 38 percent for whites. Voluntary and statutory presumptive sentencing increased black
and white male incarceration rates by well over 100 percent, but the rise was significantly
higher for blacks.
Determinate, truth, and three strikes sentencing laws raised black male incarceration rates by
69 percent, 83 percent, and 92 percent respectively. To a lesser extent, white male
incarceration rates rose by 49 percent, 57 percent, and 59 percent, respectively. These trends
underscore that sentencing reforms not only contributed to the imprisonment boom, but also
worked to widen the racial disparities in incarceration rates (Harmon 2011; Tonry 1995).
Thus, the disparate impact of sentencing reforms may help explain racial differences in the
relative supply of marriageable males, and consequently never-married female headship.

Author Manuscript

4. RESULTS
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Figure 3 illustrates the trend in never-married female headship by race from 1980 to 2010.
Although overall female headship changed negligibly from 1990 to 2011 (Figure 1), nevermarried female headship rose steadily for both blacks and whites from 1980 to 2010. In
1980, 6 percent of all black households were headed by never-married black women
compared to 3 percent of white counterparts. By 2010, never-married female headed
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households accounted for 12 percent of all black households relative to approximately 4
percent of all white households. Therefore, never-married female headship doubled among
black households and increased by 33 percent among white households.

Author Manuscript

Over the same four-decade period, a large racial disparity in the relative supply of
marriageable males is also evident. The relative supply of marriageable males is defined as
the race-, age-, LMACZ-, and year-specific ratio of unmarried males employed or in school
to unmarried females. Figure 4 indicates that the dearth of marriageable males is
significantly more severe for blacks than whites. In 1980, the relative supply of marriageable
males was 40 percent for blacks and 60 percent for whites. By 2010, this measure declined
to 35 percent for blacks and 55 percent for whites. This suggests that black women face a
considerably less favorable marriage market pool relative to white women. It may also
explain the striking growth and racial disparity in never-married female headship illustrated
in Figure 3.

Author Manuscript

Table 1 shows key differences in characteristics of black and white female-heads of
household. Black female-heads of household have on average one more child than white
female-heads of households. In addition, about 60 percent of never-married black femaleheads have high school diplomas or less; this is only characteristic of a little over 30 percent
of never-married white female-heads. There is a higher percentage of black female-heads in
their 30s relative to white female-heads. However, there is a higher percentage of white
female-heads are younger than 25 and older than 44. Welfare benefits and median female
earnings are statistically similar for black and white female heads as these measures are not
constructed along racial lines. On the other hand, male incarceration rates differ significantly
by race – black male incarceration rates are about eight times as large as white male
incarceration rates.
For all households, there are fewer racial differences in these characteristics. For instance,
both black and white households have approximately 1 child. The age distribution as well as
earnings are also statistically similar. Some racial disparities persist, nonetheless.
Specifically, black male incarceration rates are significantly higher than white male
incarceration rates. In addition, sixty-seven percent of black households have high school
diplomas or less compared to 53 percent of white households.
4.2. Main Regression Findings

Author Manuscript

Table 2 shows OLS and probit marginal effects on never-married female headship for blacks
and whites respectively. The results from Table 2 suggest that the decline in the relative
supply of marriageable males substantially raises female headship for both blacks and
whites. The results indicate that a one-unit decline in the relative supply of marriage males
raises the odds of never-married female headship by 3.2 – 7.5 percentage points (p <0.01)
for blacks and about 2 percentage points (p <0.01) for whites.
Despite these robust findings, potential bias from latent heterogeneity and measurement
error must be addressed. Table 3 presents IV and IVProbit estimates on the relative supply of
marriageable males by using binary indicators equal to one for states with sentencing
reforms currently in effect. To the extent that these instrumental variables are both
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exogenous and strongly correlated with the relative supply of marriageable males, IV and
IVProbit estimation allow for causal inferences on the effect of the relative supply of
marriageable males on never-married female headship from 1980 to 2010. The first-stage F
statistics indicate that sentencing reforms are strongly correlated with the relative supply of
marriageable males for both blacks and whites (see Appendix B for first-stage results).
Therefore, to the extent that sentencing reforms are exogenously determined in the female
headship model, the IV and IVProbit results show that the decline in the relative supply of
marriageable males increase the odds of never-married female headship among blacks. A
one-unit decline in the relative supply of marriageable males raises the odds of nevermarried female headship by 35.9 – 40.1 percentage points (p<0.01). Even with a first-stage
F-statistic that is larger than that of blacks, IV and IVProbit estimates bear positive signs for
whites. Moreover, the IV estimate is not statistically different from zero.

Author Manuscript

It is important to note that IV and IVProbit marginal effects are substantially larger than
corresponding OLS and Probit marginal effects. This is because instrumental variables
specifications provide estimates that are local average treatment effects (LATE): estimates
are derived from the portion of the variation in the endogenous variable that is strongly
correlated with the outcome variable but exogenous to the error term.
In summary, it is apparent that the effect of male marriageability on never-married female
headship differs markedly by race. In general, never-married female headship is negatively
associated with the relative supply of marriageable black males in naïve, IV, and IVProbit
models. However, this inverse relationship is not observed for whites once biases from latent
heterogeneity and measurement error are mitigated.

Author Manuscript

OLS and probit models provide other interesting findings. Fertility or the number of children
is positively linked to never-married female headship among blacks, while the opposite is
true for whites. Having one more child raises the odds of never-married female headship by
about two percentage points (p<0.01) for blacks but lowers the odds by about two
percentage points for whites (p<0.01). Relative to 18-24 year olds, women 25-29 years old
are more likely to become never-married female-heads by about 3 percentage points for
blacks and 1 percentage point for whites (p<0.01). After 30 years old however, women are
significantly less likely to become never-married female-heads. This is especially evident at
ages 45 and older, where the likelihood of never-married female headship increases by up to
11.1 percentage points (p<0.01) for blacks and 5.2 percentage points for whites (p<0.01).
These results suggest that never married female headship plagues women under 30 years old
regardless of race.

Author Manuscript

For both blacks and whites, average female earnings and college education are positively
associated with never-married female headship. While male incarceration rates increase the
odds of never-married female headship among blacks, this relationship is not statistically
significant for whites.
In contrast to the previous literature (Hoffman and Foster 2000; Lichter, McLaughlin, and
Ribar 1997; Moffitt 1996, 1998; Murray 1993; Rosenzweig 1999), the study does confirm
welfare incentives for never-married female headship. However, the study uses a state-level
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measure of welfare benefits. The individual-level measure would be more suitable for
identifying welfare-incentive effects; this goes beyond the scope of this study.
4.3. Sensitivity Checks
While prior evidence from Darity and Myers (1995) shows that our measure of the relative
supply of marriageable males (i.e., the ratio of unmarried males employed or in school to
unmarried females) strongly explains female headship among both blacks and whites
(relative to the other measures analyzed), this measure does have limitations. As stated in the
Data section, the male marriageability measure is restricted to heterosexual and racially
homogenous marriage markets. Individuals who identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual account
for less than 5% of the population (Gates 2006) and may therefore be a reasonable
assumption in this model. On the other hand, inter-racial relationships are increasing over
time, especially among whites.

Author Manuscript

The study tests the sensitivity of the results to a new measure of male marriageability that is
no longer restricted to racially homogenous marriage markets. Tables 4 and 5 present results
for the ratio of all unmarried males who are employed or in school to unmarried females.
The IV and IVProbit results indicate that the relative supply of marriageable males is
negatively associated with never-married female family headship among blacks but not for
whites.

Author Manuscript

It is important to highlight that for blacks, estimates are lower when the relative supply of
marriageable males is defined over racially homogenous marriage markets. This is likely
because black women have low interracial marriage rates and using this alternative measure
signals a much larger marriage pool than is realistically available to black female heads of
household. Hence, this new measure is subject to attenuation bias and accounts for the much
smaller estimate in Table 5 than in Table 3.
Another potential limitation of the male marriageability measure is that our geographic
definition of the marriage market as a labor market area/commuting zone (LMACZ) may be
viewed as restrictive for some individuals. Therefore, we define a new measure that is statespecific rather than LMACZ-specific. Naïve and instrumental variables results are presented
in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. Still, IV and IVProbit results in Table 7 reinforce the general
findings in Table 3.

Author Manuscript

The main empirical specification also makes assumptions about the exogeneity of the
additional control variables. Our specification implicitly assumes that the individual- and
state-specific covariates are not correlated with the error term when LMACZ-specific, statespecific, and general time trends are accounted for. However, black and white women in
never-married female-headed households differ significantly in their fertility patterns. As
Table 1 shows, black women have higher levels of fertility than white women on average.
Male incarceration rates also differ conspicuously by race. Therefore, number of children
and male incarceration rates as a covariates in IV and IVProbit specifications may be
problematic if these variables are correlated with unobserved characteristics in the error
term.
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Table 8 presents new specifications that use sentencing reforms to instrument for the relative
supply of marriageable males, number of children, and male incarceration rates. This is
based on the argument that sentencing reforms increase male incarceration as well as limit
fertility. The first-stage F-statistics confirm that sentencing reforms are strongly correlated
with the relative supply of marriageable males as well as fertility and male incarceration
rates. Nevertheless, IV and IVProbit results confirm that the relative supply of marriageable
males is inversely linked to never-married female headship for blacks, but not for whites.

5. CONCLUSION

Author Manuscript

The black-white disparity in never-married female-headed households has remained a
stubborn condition over the past few decades. This has provoked inquiry as to why it has not
receded even in the face of welfare reforms and secular improvements in economic
opportunities for women. Using data from IPUMS-USA (1980–2010), our study investigates
how the relative supply of marriageable males – measured as the ratio of unmarried males in
the labor force or in school to unmarried females – influences never-married female family
headship from 1980 to 2010 for blacks and whites.
The empirical findings from our study reinforce evidence of an inverse relationship between
male marriageability and female headship among never-married women (Darity and Myers
1995; Neal 2004: South 1996). This relationship, however, varies substantially by race.
Using state-level variation in sentencing reforms – to mitigate omitted variable bias and
measurement error – instrumental variables (IV) and instrumental variables-probit
(IVProbit) both indicate that the decline in the relative supply of marriageable black males
contributes to the transition of black women into never-married female headship. However,
this relationship could not be confirmed for whites.

Author Manuscript

The absence of the inverse relationship between male marriageability and female family
headship among whites should not be surprising, since they face more favorable marriage
market and economic conditions. There is a near 3:5 ratio of marriageable males to
unmarried females for whites; this ratio is 2:5 for blacks. Therefore, an attempt to increase
the relative supply of marriageable males may not reduce never-married white female
headship by much, if at all.

Author Manuscript

We can infer from our findings that the prevalence of female family headship is possibly
driven by different mechanisms for blacks and whites. To the extent that the sentencing
reforms are exogenously determined in the model, the dearth of marriageable males may
help explain female headship among blacks. The scarcity of marriageable black males works
to reduce marriage opportunities for black women while simultaneously raising male
bargaining power in the marriage market. Consequently, black men can reap marital rewards
outside of marriage (Cready, Fossett, Kiecolt 1997; Willis 1999), boosting both non-marital
fertility and female headship.
For whites however, there is no statistically conclusive evidence that the dearth of
marriageable males is responsible for the persistence of never-married female headship. Our
study reveals that white female-heads of household are more highly educated with fewer
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children than black counterparts. As such, education and fertility may explain the nevermarried female headship structure among whites (rather than the relative supply of
marriageable males).
This study is not without its limitations. It focuses on heterosexual marriage markets, since
state approval of same-sex marriages did not begin until the turn of this century. Cohabiting
relationships may also conflate female-headed households since they could not be
differentiated in the data. Finally, the study focuses on racially homogenous marriage
markets that are defined by labor market areas/commuting zones (LMACZs). However,
sensitivity analysis that relaxes this assumption arrives at similar conclusions.

Author Manuscript

Despite these limitations, the study presents salient evidence for understanding the racial
divide in never-married female-headed households. In contrast to much prior literature (e.g.,
Hoffman and Foster 2000; Lichter, McLaughlin, and Ribar 1997; Moffitt 1992, 1994;
Murray 1993; Rosenzweig 1999), the study does not confirm a substantive relationship
between female family headship and welfare generosity. Our study does not measure welfare
participation at the individual-level, which may account for the difference in findings.
Therefore, future research should investigate other factors that explicate the female family
headship phenomenon more comprehensively, especially for whites.

Appendix A
Table A1

Sentencing Reforms by State
State

Presum

Author Manuscript

Alabama

Vol

Stat

Deter

Truth

Strikes

2006

Alaska

1980

Arizona

1978

1994

1994

California

1976

1976

1994

Colorado

1979

1979

Arkansas

1994

1995

Connecticut
Delaware

1994
1994

1981

1995

1994

1987

1990

1990

1983

1983

1995

1995

1995

1995

DC
Florida

1994

Georgia
Hawaii

Author Manuscript

Idaho
Illinois

1978

Indiana

1977

1977

Iowa
Kansas

1994
1996

1993

1993

1994

Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

1987

1994
1976

1995
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State

Presum

Maryland

Vol

Stat

Deter

Truth

1983

Strikes
1994

Massachusetts
Michigan

1999

Minnesota

1980

1984

1994

Mississippi
Missouri

1982

1993

1995

1995

1997

1994

Montana

1995

Nebraska
Nevada

1995

New Hampshire

Author Manuscript

New Jersey

1977

New Mexico

1977

1995
1977

New York
North Carolina

1994
1995

1995

1981

1996

1996

1996

Oregon

1989

1989

1995

Pennsylvania

1982

North Dakota
Ohio

1994

1994

1995

1995

Oklahoma

1991

Rhode Island
South Carolina

1995

South Dakota
Tennessee

1995

1981

1996
1989

Author Manuscript

1995

1995

1985

1995

Texas
Utah

1985

Vermont

1995

Virginia
Washington

1995
1984

1995

1995

1994

1984

1984

1993

1999

1994

West Virginia
Wisconsin

1985

Wyoming

Notes: Table adapted from Harmon (2016)
Presum – Presumptive sentencing
Vol – Voluntary sentencing

Author Manuscript

Stat – Statutory presumptive sentencing
Deter – Determinate sentencing
Truth – Truth in sentencing
Strikes – Three strikes laws
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Appendix B
Table B1

First Stage OLS Estimates
(1)

(2)

Black
OLS

White
OLS

Presumptive

−0.021
[0.001]***

−0.014
[0.000]***

Voluntary

−0.026
[0.001]***

0.002
[0.000]***

Statutory

0.115
[0.003]***

0.000
[0.001]

Determinate

0.031
[0.001]***

0.012
[0.000]***

Truth

0.026
[0.001]***

0.024
[0.000]***

Three Strikes

−0.047
[0.001]***

0.015
[0.000]***

1st Stage F-Statistics

1012.85***

3066.72***

Observations

780,052

4,178,670

VARIABLES

Sentencing Reforms

Author Manuscript

Standard errors in parentheses

***

p<0.001,

**

p<0.01,

*

p<0.05

Author Manuscript

Notes: All first-stage regressions control for age, education, number of children, maximum welfare benefits, median female
earnings, and male incarceration rates; state-specific, labor market areas/commuting-zones-specific, and general trend
variables.
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Author Manuscript

Fraction of Female-Headed Households by Race
Notes: U.S. Census Bureau (2000)
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Figure 2.

Percentage Change in Male Incarceration Rates Post-Sentencing Reforms
Data: National Prisoner Statistics, IPUMS-USA (1980–2010)
Notes: All percentage changes are statistically different from zero.
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Figure 3.

Trends in Never-Married Female Family Headship by Race (1980–2010)
Data: IPUMS-USA (1980–2010)
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Figure 4.

Relative Supply of Marriageable Males (1980–2010)
Data: IPUMS-USA (1980–2010)
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Summary Statistics for Never-Married Female-Headed and All Households
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OLS and PROBIT Results (Dependent Variable: Never-Married Female Headship)
(1)

(2)

(3)

Black

(4)
White

VARIABLES

OLS

PROBIT

OLS

PROBIT

Male Marriageability Ratio

−0.032
(0.012)***

−0.483
(0.070) ***

−0.021
(0.007)***

−0.284
(0.056)***

−0.075

−0.019

Individual-level Controls
25≤Age≤29

0.049
(0.004)***

0.180
(0.014)***

30≤Age≤34

0.010
(0.005)**

−0.023
(0.021)

−0.025
(0.005)***

−0.215
(0.026)***

0.012
(0.002)***

0.028

Author Manuscript

35≤Age≤39

−0.004

0.008
−0.009
(0.002)***

−0.045
(0.005)***

−0.330
(0.028)***

−0.085
(0.007)***

−0.710
(0.037)***

−0.029
(0.003)***

0.018
(0.002)***

0.099
(0.008)***

−0.307
(0.029)***

−0.020
−0.059
(0.007)***

−0.111
Number of Children

−0.162
(0.028)***

−0.011

−0.052
Age >44

−0.042
(0.023)*

−0.003
−0.019
(0.003)***

−0.034
40≤Age≤44

0.115
(0.017)***

−0.783
(0.051)***

−0.052
−0.016
(0.001)***

0.015

−0.343
(0.016)***

−0.023

Economic Status
HS Diploma

−0.000
(0.002)

Author Manuscript

0.037
(0.011)***

0.002
(0.001)**

0.006
Some College

0.006
(0.002)**

0.083
(0.016)***

0.004
0.012
(0.001)***

0.013
College and Beyond

0.026
(0.003)***

0.206
(0.018)***

−0.000
(0.000)

Median Female Earnings

0.000
(0.000)***

−0.000
(0.000)

0.034
(0.002)***

0.443
(0.022)***

0.029
−0.000
(0.000)

−0.000
0.000
(0.000)***

0.215
(0.021)***

0.014

0.032
Max. Welfare Benefits

0.059
(0.015)***

−0.000
(0.000)

−0.000
0.000
(0.000)**

0.000

0.000
(0.000)**

0.000

Incarceration Rate

Author Manuscript

Male Incarceration Rate

0.000
(0.000)***

0.000
(0.000) ***

0.000
(0.000)

Log Pseudo-Likelihood

–

−225738.15

–

−535725.37

Observations

780,052

780,052

4,178,670

4,178,670

0.000

0.000
(0.000)*

0.000

Standard errors clustered at the LMACZ-level in parentheses
Probit Marginal Effects are italicized
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***

p<0.001,

**

p<0.01,

*

Author Manuscript

p<0.05

Notes: All regressions control for state-specific, labor market areas/commuting-zones-specific, and general trend variables. The reference category
for age is: 18-24 years old. The reference category for education is: high school dropout. State-level maximum welfare benefits and median female
earnings are adjusted for inflation.

Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript
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Table 3

Author Manuscript

IV and IVProbit Results (Dependent Outcome: Never-Married Female Headship)
(1)

(2)

(3)

Black

4)
White

VARIABLES

IV

IVPROBIT

IV

IVPROBIT

Male Marriageability

−0.359

−2.322

0.087

1.139

Ratio

(0.109)**†

[0.089]***†
−0.401

(0.104)

[0.098]***†

lst-Stage F Statistic

1012.85***

–

3066.72***

–

Wald test of Exogeneity

–

464.96***

–

208.97***

Observations

780,052

780,052

4,178,670

4,178,670

0.077

Standard errors clustered at the LMACZ-level in parentheses

Author Manuscript

IVProbit Marginal Effects are italicized
Standard errors in brackets

***

p<0.001,

**

p<0.01,

*

p<0.05

Notes:

†

statistically different from naïve estimates

Regressions account for individual characteristics such as age and education; state-level welfare benefits, median female earnings, and male
incarceration rates; state-specific, labor market areas/commuting-zones-specific, and general trend variables.
Instrumental Variables: Sentencing reform indicators

Author Manuscript

Instrumented: Relative supply of marriageable males

Author Manuscript
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Table 4

Author Manuscript

OLS and PROBIT Results (Dependent Outcome: Never-Married Female Headship)
(1)

(2)

(3)

Black

(4)
White

VARIABLES

OLS

PROBIT

OLS

PROBIT

Male Marriageability

−0.001

−0.013

−0.004

−0.055

Ratio (All Males)

(0.000)**

(0.003)***
−0.002

(0.003)

(0.037)

Log Pseudo-Likelihood
Observations

−0.004

−225977.84
780,052

780,052

−536348.42
4,178,670

4,178,670

Standard errors clustered at the LMACZ-level in parentheses
Probit Marginal Effects are italicized

Author Manuscript

Standard errors in brackets

***

p<0.001,

**

p<0.01,

*

p<0.05

Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript
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Table 5

Author Manuscript

IV and IVProbit Results (Dependent Outcome: Never-Married Female Headship)
(1)

(2)

(3)

Black

(4)
White

VARIABLES

IV

IVPROBIT

IV

IVPROBIT

Male Marriageability

−0.004

−0.026

0.037

0.469

Ratio (All Males)

(0.001)***†

[0.001]***†
−0.009

(0.023)

[0.026]***†

1st-Stage F Statistic

6106.68***

–

17,476.31***

–

Wald test of Exogeneity

–

91.10***

–

407.89

Observations

780,052

780,052

4,178,670

4,178,670

0.032

Standard errors clustered at the LMACZ-level in parentheses

Author Manuscript

IVProbit Marginal Effects are italicized
Standard errors in brackets

***

p<0.001,

**

p<0.01,

*

p<0.05

Notes:
Regressions account for individual characteristics such as age and education; state-level welfare benefits, median female earnings, and male
incarceration rates; state-specific, labor market areas/commuting-zones-specific, and general trend variables.
Instrumental Variables: Sentencing reform indicators
Instrumented: Relative supply of marriageable males (All males)
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Table 6

Author Manuscript

OLS and PROBIT Results (Dependent Outcome: Never-Married Female Headship)
(1)

(2)

(3)

Black

(4)
White

VARIABLES

OLS

PROBIT

OLS

PROBIT

Male Marriageability

−0.146

−0.657

−0.030

−0.152

Ratio (State-level)

(0.030)***

(0.187)***
−0.102

(0.012)

(0.105)

Log Pseudo-Likelihood

–

−226167.47

–

−536407.35

Observations

780,052

780,052

4,178,670

4,178,670

−0.010

Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses
Probit Marginal Effects are italicized

Author Manuscript

Standard errors in brackets

***

p<0.001,

**

p<0.01,

*

p<0.05

Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript
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Table 7

Author Manuscript

IV and IVProbit Results (Dependent Outcome: Never-Married Female Headship)
(1)

(2)

(3)

Black

(4)
White

VARIABLES

IV

IVPROBIT

IV

IVPROBIT

Male Marriageability

−1.343

−8.324

0.140**

2.120

Ratio (State-level)

(0.414)***†

[0.231]***†

(0.085)

[0.102]***†

−1.302

0.135

1st-Stage F Statistic

3572.21***

–

24,260.25***

–

Wald test of Exogeneity

–

1176.30***

–

503.16***

Observations

780,052

780,052

4,178,670

4,178,670

Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses

Author Manuscript

IVProbit Marginal Effects are italicized
Standard errors in brackets

***

p<0.001,

**

p<0.01,

*

p<0.05

Notes:

†

statistically different from naïve estimates

Regressions account for individual characteristics such as age and education; state-level welfare benefits, median female earnings, and male
incarceration rates; state-specific, labor market areas/commuting-zones-specific, and general trend variables.
Instrumental Variables: Sentencing reform indicators

Author Manuscript

Instrumented: Relative supply of marriageable males (State-level measure)

Author Manuscript
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Table 8

Author Manuscript

IV and IVProbit Results (Dependent Outcome: Never-Married Female Headship)
(1)

(2)

(3)

Black

(4)
White

VARIABLES

IV

IVPROBIT

IV

IVPROBIT

Male Marriageability

−0.105

−0.665

0.034

0.416

Ratio

(0.077)

[0.149]***
−0.135

(0.107)

[0.113]***†

Number of Children

−0.268
(0.034)***†

−1.728
[0.084]**† −0.352

−0.032
(0.021)

Male Inc. Rates

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
[0.000]*

0.000
(0.000)**

0.000
[0.000]*** 0.000

1st-Stage F Statistic (MM)

1131.58***

–

3079.44***

–

1st-Stage F Statistic (# Kids)

293.34***

–

1828.98***

–

1st-Stage F Statistic (Male Inc.)

27090.52***

–

130,000***

–

Wald test of Exogeneity

–

1886.68***

Observations

780,052

780,052

0.030
−0.595
[0.030]***†

−0.044

0.000

Author Manuscript

473.14***
4,178,670

4,178,670

Standard errors clustered at the LMACZ-level in parentheses
IVProbit Marginal Effects are italicized
Standard errors in brackets

***

p<0.001,

**

p<0.01,

Author Manuscript

*

p<0.05

Notes:

†

statistically different from naïve estimates.

Regressions account for individual characteristics such as age and education; state-level welfare benefits, median female earnings; state-specific,
labor market areas/commuting-zones-specific, and general trend variables.
Instrumental Variables: Sentencing reform indicators
Instrumented: Relative supply of marriageable males, number of children, and male incarceration rates.
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